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It is a basic tenet of democratic rights that those af-
fected by policies have the chance to be heard.Parti-
cipation also improves the decision-making process.
Those affected are usually specialists closer to the
issue than are generalist politicians. Well-informed
decisions are not made in ivory towers, and the will-
ingness of political actors to listen to the public is a
necessary precondition of good-decision making.
Otherwise there is a substantial risk that important
information will not be included in the decision-
making process.As a consequence unbalanced or at
worst unrealistic policies emerge.
At the same time, one of the most controversial
aspects of politics is lobbying and how private actors
can take control of the political decision-making pro-
cess. The public generally believes that influence
seeking leads to biased policies catering to the inter-
est of a few at the expense of the general public. Of-
ten this leads to the perception that certain groups
(“big business”, for example) unduly influence or
even “buy”politics.Examples abound in many coun-
tries – I will consider two recent ones from Germany.
In the year 2000, the red-green coalition of Chancel-
lor Gerhard Schröder reached an agreement with
the German nuclear power plant operators on the
phasing-out of nuclear energy production in Ger-
many. This “nuclear consensus” supposedly ended a
long-standing debate about the peaceful use of nuc-
lear power generation,which began in the 1970s and
has divided the German public for many decades. In
2009/10, the conservative coalition of Chancellor
Angela Merkel decided to end this consensus and
extend the deadline for phasing out nuclear power.
Surveys indicate that the great majority of the public
rejects this policy change. One reason seems to be
ideas about who will profit the extension: a majority
believes that the policy change benefits the four nuc-
lear power generating companies, whereas a clear
minority thinks that the lifetime extension benefits the
ordinary citizen (Infratest dimap 2010a, b).
From a lobbying perspective, the circumstances sur-
rounding the decision-making process might have
spurred the idea that the lifetime extension of nuc-
lear power plants was not justified. Aspects relating
to transparency apparently played a crucial role in
creating this impression.First,the government based
its decision on a scientific report by the Institute of
Energy Economics (EWI) at the University of
Cologne (and two others).The financial structure of
the EWI led to doubts about its scientific indepen-
dence.Important financiers of the EWI are E.ON and
RWE, which benefit greatly from the lifetime exten-
sion. The institute has never published detailed in-
formation about their financial dependency on
E.ON and RWE,not even upon request.Second,the
parliamentary process that ensued made the impres-
sion that urgent action was necessary.Leading mem-
bers of the opposition stated that crucial participato-
ry rights were ignored,that an orderly parliamentary
process did not take place and not all relevant issues
were thoroughly discussed in the parliamentary com-
mittee meetings. Third, during the debate it was re-
vealed that the government had secretly bargained
an agreement with the nuclear power industry,which
provided for the redistribution of part of the extra
profits generated by the lifetime extension to state
finances, thereby anticipating a parliamentary deci-
sion which at that time had not yet been voted on.
The existence of the agreement was made known to
the public by coincidence and only subsequently re-
vealed by the government.
These circumstances provoked numerous remarks
about politicians catering too much to lobbying in-
terests and having lost their focus on good decision
making.It was not only opposition party leaders who
accused the government of biased policies but also
representatives of the governing coalition parties
themselves.For instance,the president of the German
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of the German state and a member of the governing
Christian Democrats Union, stated that due to gov-
ernmental pressure there was not sufficient time for
consultations, leading to a suspicion of negligence in
the parliamentary decision-making process. In his
opinion the arguments brought forward in connec-
tion with the lifetime extension were devoid of plau-
sibility.Important aspects of the law were negotiated
rather than founded in fact (FAZ.net 2010).
A second example which underscores the importance
of transparency in lobbying is the employment of
external staff members in German ministries. Initi-
ated by a former federal minister of the interior and
German companies in 2004, the “Staff Exchange Pro-
gram” is aimed at an interchange in personnel be-
tween the administration and industry in order to
gain mutual insights into their structures and proce-
dures and to “increase understanding of their concerns
and interests” (Bundesregierung 2006). This practice,
which in fact led to industry-paid staff members being
lent to ministries for several months, came to the pub-
lic’s attention in 2006.The question arose as to whether
the program serves as a means for industry to influence
law making at a very early stage of the decision-mak-
ing process. A supervisory process conducted by the
Federal Audit Office resulted in the establishment of
rules for the government: since 2008 the federal minis-
ter of the interior is obliged to annually inform a par-
liamentary committee about the staff employed and
the terms and duration of their employment. These
reports are not disclosed to the public.
These examples indicate that the institutional frame-
work within which lobbying takes place is important.
It affects substantially the welfare of the country and
the acceptance of politics by the general public.Eco-
nomics can provide a good tool to analyze the mech-
anisms underlying lobbying and how it affects wel-
fare. But the institutional framework is also impor-
tant and needs to be investigated. This puts a more
country-specific aspect in the research agenda.
Is lobbying good or bad?
The question whether lobbying is harmful or benefi-
cial is closely related to its channel of influence.First,
lobbying may occur as a kind of trade, an exchange
of benefits.In a seminal paper (Grossman and Help-
man 1994),the politician is posited as being interest-
ed in maximizing aggregate welfare, for instance be-
cause he cares for the general public or hopes to be
re-elected. He is ready to deviate from this welfare-
maximizing policy in exchange for private benefits,
i.e.,money for his own or the party’s use or anything
else beneficial to him like the mobilization of swing
voters. An interest group donates these benefits in
exchange for policy deviation in line with the inter-
ests of that group.As a by-product aggregate welfare
decreases. If lobbying occurs through this channel of
influence, it is not welfare enhancing for at least two
reasons.
One reason lies within the logic of the model.With-
out special interest groups, the politician does not
face incentives to deviate from the welfare-maximiz-
ing policy.It is the existence of interest groups which
brings these incentives into play, and this does not
increase welfare. How harmful it is depends on dif-
ferent factors like the degree of organization of com-
peting interests, the ability of the politician to favor
special interests or the policy instrument at hand. If
lobbying competition is strong, it does not tend to
reduce welfare significantly.All interest groups try to
influence politics in their favor. Since all do so,
everyone is trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma paying
contributions just to avoid unfavorable policies in
case of absence. In fact, with strong competition be-
tween opposing interests, we are tempted to take a
more relaxed view of lobbying even if it involves an
exchange of benefits. The opposite applies if lobby-
ing competition is weak.Interest groups may then in-
fluence policies at low costs, resulting in effective
lobbying and reduced welfare. Next consider the
likelihood of the politician catering to special inter-
ests and the policy instrument at hand. If the politi-
cian cares a great deal about welfare, compensation
payments for policy deviations must be high. Then
lobbying is costly and less influential.That politicians
care about aggregate welfare is likely to depend on
the policy instrument and on the institutional frame-
work. Suppose the general public prefers reliable
and welfare-oriented politicians, and assume their
behavior is easily observed. For the politician align-
ment with special interests bears the risk of being
perceived as unreliable and greedy. It may also play
a role if the policy is technically difficult to under-
stand or can be communicated without difficulty. In
the latter case, transparency is high, and lobbying
tends to be less harmful.
The second reason why lobbying may be harmful, if
it is carried out as a trade, is beyond the scope of the
model. It is of no less importance and takes into ac-
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count the responsibilities and duties of politicians
and bureaucrats alike. State representatives receive
their mandate from the general public, conferred
through elections or by a service commitment to the
state. They are agents on behalf of the general pub-
lic, a role which is coincidently accompanied by
power. It is not the power of a private person acting
in a private sphere,but that of an agent committed to
the tasks and duties for the best of the citizens. It is
bestowed upon the person and temporarily awarded,
but not deserved.As a result of this relationship be-
tween the agent and the general public, it is presup-
posed that personal benefits are not gained from
office and expected that dignitaries adhere to this
principle. If lobbying occurs as an exchange of pub-
lic benefits for the official’s own or the party’s bene-
fits,he violates the implicit contract between himself
as an agent and the citizen as the principal. Not only
is it detrimental to the participants of the contract, it
also involves a more general implication.Democracy
rests on participation and relies on the identification
of the citizen with government representatives.If lob-
bying exploits this relationship,identification may de-
teriorate and lead to a general disenchantment with
politics. In a worst-case scenario lobbying could un-
dermine democracy. Of course, it is impossible to leg-
islate personal integrity, but a transparent institution-
al framework will no doubt promote openness and
discourse.
This view of lobbying changes if it takes place through
its second channel of influence – the transmission of
information (Potters and van Winden 1992). Politi-
cians are generalists who rely on information which
experts provide.Since independent and reliable infor-
mation is not always available, it may be beneficial to
listen to information even though it is most likely
biased. Information transmission may occur in vastly
different forms, for instance as mass movements like
demonstrations (indicating public preferences) or as
statements, scientific reports or face-to-face commu-
nication.If the politician is able to extract the reliable
part of the content, lobbying tends to be welfare
enhancing. It reduces the risk of misaligned policies
and increases the quality of the decision-making
process.The beneficial effect tends to be stronger with
intense lobbying competition. Political institutions
should thus be open and provide fair,equal and time-
ly access to all involved groups.
Lobbying still has shortcomings even within the sec-
ond channel of influence and with open institutions.
Since Olson (1965) made his famous statement about
the group formation process, we should be skeptical
about the idea that anyone with a specific interest
will be able to formulate his view and participate in
the political process. Small groups with strong and
focused interests find it easier to overcome the free-
rider problem associated with political action than
do large groups with minimal cohesion.Thus, even if
lobbying occurs as information transmission and
tends to be welfare enhancing,issues of participation
are crucial. Underlying asymmetries in political rep-
resentation and the unequal distribution of power,
for example, are often (though not always) manifest
as business interests versus those of consumers or
environmental interests.
Institutions matter: The role of transparency
Open and transparent institutions governing influ-
ence-seeking activities promote welfare.They en-
hance the decision-making process and strengthen
the reliability of the political system. But there are
other,unresolved issues:first,even with the best pos-
sible degree of transparency, there is still the prob-
lem of the inherent asymmetry of interest represen-
tation as referred to by Olson. Second, although it is
clear that a high degree of openness and transparen-
cy is beneficial, the question of how to best imple-
ment it institutionally is not easily answered. Third,
the fact that the political system and the institutions
governing influence-seeking activities differ across
countries hamper a uniform empirical and institu-
tion-based research approach,especially for Europe.
Many contributions refer to the US, and thus the in-
sights for European countries are relatively sparse.
Institution-related research may be less attractive
for a profession which earns its spurs in internation-
al publications. However, it is of no less importance.
I would like to discuss some transparency-related is-
sues in the institutional context of Germany. Let us
examine transparency within the first channel of in-
fluence: additional incomes earned by members of
parliament (MPs). In 2005, the German parliament
made the decision to increase transparency with re-
spect to the additional incomes of its members. Ac-
cording to this rule, which came into effect in 2007
after the failure of a group of MPs to question its con-
stitutionality, every MP is required to provide a re-
port about his additional income.Any activity which
takes place outside parliament is reported as well as
the amount of income generated. There are no de-
tails given, but the amounts range from EUR 1,000to 3,500 (step 1), EUR 3,500 to 7,000 (step 2) and
more than EUR 7,000 (step 3).Although publication
of the data increases transparency, the decision not
to break down income above EUR 7,000 appears
arbitrary and less transparent. (Nor is there a justifi-
cation for this restriction in the wording of the law.)
As it is likely that the incomes of influential MPs lie
substantially above these amounts, the law obscures
the real income situation. A higher degree of trans-
parency would be possible at very low costs.
The publication of this data has led to research with
the aim of identifying patterns of payments. (It also
reveals that,exceptions aside,most of the members did
not receive excessive outside earnings).Personal char-
acteristics of the MPs,like party affiliation,explain the
differences in activities and earnings (Mause 2009).
For instance, MPs from the Christian Democrats
Union and the Liberals engage more often in econom-
ic-related activities than members of other parties, but
they differ according to average earnings.The average
earnings of the ruling parties do not differ much and
are significantly higher compared to those of the par-
ties presently in the opposition. The question of whe-
ther these are party-specific effects or related to the
individuals in office cannot be determined, since there
are as yet no time series available.The duration of par-
liamentary membership also plays a role and is posi-
tively correlated to earnings. The extent of electoral
competition influences outside activities as well
(Beckers et al. 2009). MPs facing less political compe-
tition tend to engage in more outside activities.
We will now examine the second institutional aspect,
the creation of a lobbying register. It relates to the
second channel of influence and aims at increasing
transparency by publishing data about lobbyists and
their activities. The question is how to design an in-
stitution that allows for the publication of meaning-
ful and timely information at reasonable costs. The
existing practice, a list of registered lobbyists at the
federal parliament, does not provide useful and timely
information about lobbying activities (for instance
statements provided to politicians). At the European
level, the same applies to the creation of a transparen-
cy register,even though the Joint Working group of the
European Parliament and the European Commission
recently agreed to a draft proposal for publishing data
which also includes aggregate money expenditures.
To obtain a better understanding of the issues at
hand, timely access to relevant lobbying activities
are important. (Publication in retrospect is interest-
ing in terms of research,but less appropriate in terms
of critically monitoring good decision making and
public participation.) To a substantial extent, lobby-
ing takes place as the provision of information,often
informal and in bilateral talks. How can a lobbying
register cover these activities and be feasible? Is it
suitable to make any paper written by an interest
group available to the public? What about accessibi-
lity – information covering who meets whom? Would
it be beneficial, for example, for government mem-
bers to inform the public about who attends their
meetings? If so, who should be affected by such a
rule – just the executive branch of the government or
ordinary members of parliament as well? Successful
lobbyism not only occurs at top levels but also to a
substantial extent at the lower levels of administra-
tion.There are good reasons to make more informa-
tion available, but the details of appropriate proce-
dures are difficult to determine and require debate.
A third institutional issue also relates to the practice
of “revolving doors”.As the employment of external
staff members in German administrations indicated,
there are good reasons to believe that lending paid
staff does more harm than good, especially if the
public is not informed. If the administration needs
external expertise,it could use alternative means like
expert hearings or consulting services.This may cre-
ate costs,but employing staff who only pretend to be
objective is considerably worse. The revolving door
practices also affect the activities of officials after
their terms end.The free choice of the employer is a
basic right which former politicians and bureaucrats
enjoy as does everyone else.However,it is likely that
an official will have gained access to confidential in-
formation,such as business secrets.If a general phase-
out period is needed,what is best in terms of duration
and coverage? Institutional questions are rife with
lobbying issues.They are difficult to solve, but crucial
for the quality of the decision-making process and the
effect that lobbying may exert.
Conclusions
Lobbies, whether business or grass-root organiza-
tions, represent particular interests. Whatever strat-
egy appears best from a group’s perspective,the pub-
lic conduct of a lobbyist is likely to be that of some-
one pretending to act on behalf of the general pub-
lic. We should be critical of this, but there are good
reasons to take a more relaxed stance if lobbying is
transparent and open to all interests.
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The discussion of political institutions is country spe-
cific, but transparency plays an important role. First,
the availability of comprehensive and timely infor-
mation about who receives money from whom is
crucial. This applies both to party donations and
MP’s additional incomes. Second, there is a need for
effective rules governing the revolving door practice,
specifically the trade-off incentives for those officials
catering to special interests during their terms and
the freedom of choice after their terms have expired.
Third, there is a need to improve transparency con-
cerning who has access to whom and the information
provided to politicians. Modern communication
technology may offer a new perspective on this issue.
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